On the one hand diplomatically impolite warning created deep crises of confidence in Turkish-American relations and anti-US stance in Turkish public opinion which began after the U2 and Cuban missile crises reached its climax. Turkey realized that the US could leave her alone at a push began to follow a multi-directional foreign policy first time after the Second World War. On the other hand Greece concerning that the US was negotiating with Turkey about partition of the island thought that the US supports Turkey since her interest in the Middle East.

Three years later in November 1967 hostility flared up again when enosis-inspired attacks on two Turkish Cypriot villages came into existence in Cyprus.  Turkey threatened for the invasion again. This time US conducted an active but sensitive diplomacy in between Turkey and Greece to prevent crises getting worse. The crises ended after Grivas and over ten thousand Greek troops left the island. Relations seemed normalized thanks to US again.

Finally on 15 July 1974 the Junta believing Makarios was not sincere regarding Enosis and disturbed his relations with communists intervened directly to the island through organizing a coup against. In reaction to this Turkey comprehending this act was a proclamation of Enosis held a military operation on 20 July 1974. While Turkey thought that Greece was supported by the US in organizing coup on the other hand Greece thought that Turkey was motivated by the US in conducting a military operation and partition. As a result both Turkey and Greece came to the conclusion that the US did not serve their national interests.




 The main purpose of this research project is to understand and reveal the reflections of Greek reaction to the American mediation efforts and attitude during the crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974 and compare it with Turkey’s. More specifically this study will also try to find answers to these questions:

1-        What was the exact reason for the Greek Colonels to organize a coup in Cyprus: Enosis, Anti-Makarios feelings, to prove mettle, Partition? What was the main disagreement in between Makarios and Junta and before organizing a coup; was the Junta convinced that US would not allow Turkey to get involved in the island?

2-        The Turkish intervention and invasion in 1974 following the coup, was it really an act of protection of the Turkish Cypriot Minority or a long standing policy aimed at the division of the island. In another words Is it true that Turkey had been waiting for an excuse to intervene the island?

3-        Why the US actively mediated in 1964 and 1967 did not stop Turkey from intervening and invading the island and Greek generals organizing a coup against Makarios in the summer of 1974; Did the US followed the policy of partition, What was US-USSR relations and the secretary of state Henry Kissenger’s role during the crises of 1974?

4-        We know little about the Soveit Union’s foreign policy towards Cyprus during the crises and the way it impacted upon Greek-Turkish relations. What were the Greek-Soviet relations during the crises and reflections on Greek-US relations?


To obtain a complete understanding of what the sequence of events was and what exactly happened and how, this research project intends to go through the policies of all the powers concerned (US, USSR, Britain, Turkey, and Greece) and comprehend a better understanding related to the project issue. I will also try to discuss that the Cyprus issue was not “settled” in 1974; quite the opposite is the case and still effects Greek-Turkish relations.




 There is an extensive literature in Turkish, Greek and English on Cyprus question and the crises in question. To conduct the research project, I will review literature, conduct interviews, analyze governmental primary documents and newspapers. All sources will serve to provide essential background on the core research questions, help gaining new point of views through which I can fully analyze the origins and the holistic effects of the crises. Throughout this research primary and secondary resources in national archives “particularly” in Greece, Turkey, US, UK and Cyprus will be used. I expect to find more and specific information about my research and expect to find chance to use both electronic and printed sources, as well as books, newspaper articles and magazine in Greece.

I also plan to conduct interviews with diplomats served in Turkey, Cyprus and US, academics and journalists. The interviews will be regarding to the questions I advance during the research. Below there is short evaluation of literature related to my research project. Through all these studies I will first try to understand Greek foreign policy in Cyprus and reaction to US and Turkey’s approach to the crises and compare. Then I will analyze the reactions of the countries in issue relatively to the policy of US towards the crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974.




 There are number of academic studies in Turkey, Greece and the world related to the 1964, 1967 and 1974 Cyprus crises the results of which continue to influence the current deadlock. An important part of these studies focuses either on the historical dimension of the problem or evaluates it through international respect. But these studies are low in synthesizing the views of all parts. For that reason this work in order to gain an insight synthesizing the views of all parts and reflects it more accurately and aims at exploring the primary and secondary resources directly from the original languages of the countries concerned. Furthermore this study not only deals with reflecting the historical process or quoting the political developments but also attempt to take public opinion into account the developments in the domestic counterparts of the subject. This method will pave the way for analyzing the concrete events and facts occurred during the development of problem more accurately. Thus it will be determined more clearly that how the perception of two countries affects the deadlock.

An important part of academic studies on Cyprus problem consider that the foundation of Cyprus Republic in 1960 is controversial. For some Greek academics the constitution was not fair, did not meet Greek Cypriots expectations and for that reason after the independence actions towards Enosis was legitimate. (Fouskas ve Tackie, 2009; Kyriacos, 1977). Additionally according to the same academics US was behind the 1960 solution and only sought for its own regional interest and relations with Turkey. (Adams, 1972; Bitsios, 1973). When it comes to 1974, US connived and even motivated Turkey to invade the island. To them the main goal of US was to divide the island.  (Vanesiz, 1977; Stavrinidis; 1977; Stefanidis, 1999). According to Mallinson US, Turkey and Greece in common was quite worrisome about the non-aligned and communist policies of Makarios. So division of the island might be the best solution for all. (Mallinson, 2011.)

On the other hand many studies conducted by Turkish academics contend that the main purpose of the Greek Cypriots motivated by Greece was to destroy the republic, declare Enosis and drive the Turkish Cypriots away the island.  (Gazioğlu, 1986; Erim, 1975). Besides one of the most common perception is that Greece was always endevoring to interfere the island to realize Enosis with the support of US. (Birand, 1984; Güvenç, 1984). Johnson Letter which prevented Turkey from intervening the island in 1964 was the important sample in the formation of this perception. (Fırat, 1997; Göktepe, 2005; Şahin 1997). After Johnson Letter relations between Turkey and Greece deteriorated and “why we are still waiting, why we are not intervening” questions started to rise in the Turkish public opinion. (Fırat, 1997). Therefore in 1974 after Greece organized a coup in Cyprus Turkey perceiving that as a proclamation of Enosis would not remain silent. (Uslu, 2003). Undoubtedly, the most significant sensitivity of the US was to prevent the internationalization of the situation and a war in between two important NATO allies due to communist threat. (Stearns, 1992; Sönmezoğlu, 1995) . According to Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig and Christopher Hitchens US motivated and supported Turkey to invade the island. (Hitchens, O’Malley ve Craig, 2001). On the other hand some researcher claims that US could not prevent both Greece and Turkey interve the island because of Watergate scandal. (Ritcher, 2011; Constantinos, 2009;).




 For literature this research project is important and expects to be unique for two reasons: 1-Although both in national and international literature there are many studies on Greece, Turkey, US foreign policies in 1964, 1967, 1974 towards Cyprus, there is no study examining the reflection of US policy towards Cyprus in Turkey and Greece respectively. So this study firstly aims at filling this gap. 2- Besides because this research will be conducted through primary and secondary sources of the countries in issue in their original language. There is going to be an opportunity for a better comparison with the policies of parties and this also help gain a more holistic perspective.

On the other hand this research is important for both Turkish and Greek public opinion. Currently, although there are many problems between Turkey and Greece, due to the Cyprus question and affects created such as prejudice and alienation dominating government mentality and public opinion relations in between Turkey and Greece are not fully normalize. In order to return fully normalcy parties need to look back courageously, face, clarify and constitute a common viewpoint and reconcile cordially; especially in favor of their relationships with and perception towards the attitude of the US during the crises. For that reason revealing the all aspects of the crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974 might pave the way for this.




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